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ARTICLES
THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS
JEFFREY BELLIN*
One of the predominant themes in the criminal justice literature is that prosecutors
dominate the justice system. Over seventy-five years ago, Attorney General Robert
Jackson famously proclaimed that the “prosecutor has more control over life, lib-
erty, and reputation than any other person in America.” In one of the most cited
law review articles of all time, Bill Stuntz added that prosecutors—not legislators,
judges, or police—“are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.” And an
unchallenged modern consensus holds that prosecutors “rule the criminal justice
system.”
This Article applies a critical lens to longstanding claims of prosecutorial preemi-
nence. It reveals a curious echo chamber enabled by a puzzling lack of dissent.
With few voices challenging ever-more-strident prosecutor-dominance rhetoric,
academic claims became uncritical, imprecise, and ultimately incorrect.
An unchallenged consensus that “prosecutors are the criminal justice system” and
that the “institution of the prosecutor has more power than any other in the crim-
inal justice system” has real consequences for criminal justice discourse. Portraying
prosecutors as the system’s iron-fisted rulers obscures the complex interplay that
actually determines criminal justice outcomes. The overheated rhetoric of
prosecutorial preeminence fosters a superficial understanding of the criminal justice
system, overlooks the powerful forces that can and do constrain prosecutors, and
diverts attention from the most promising sources of reform (legislators, judges,
and police) to the least (prosecutors).
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INTRODUCTION
“For all intents and purposes,
prosecutors are the criminal justice system.”
—Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, 20101
Compelling assertions about prosecutorial dominance leap off the
pages of the criminal justice literature.2 These statements position
prosecutors as the most prominent stars in the criminal justice uni-
verse, bending all others to their will. The ubiquitous sentiment
appears in a variety of contexts. Most broadly, rhetorical allusions to
prosecutors’ vast power illustrate the uneven contest between the gov-
ernment and a criminal defendant.3 More pointed claims of
prosecutorial preeminence single out prosecutors—not judges, legisla-
tures, or police, and not facts, laws, or crime—as the key explanatory
variable for criminal justice outcomes.4 These claims typically serve as
the foundation for empirical assertions that prosecutors bear primary
responsibility for everything from wrongful convictions5 to mass incar-
1 Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Introduction to Prosecutorial Power: A Transnational
Symposium, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) (“Prosecutors are the Darth Vader of
academic writing: mysterious, powerful and, for the most part, bad.”); David Alan
Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 480 (2016) (“The starting point for virtually every discussion of
prosecutors in the United States is their tremendous clout.”); see also infra Part I
(delineating various overbroad prosecutorial-power claims).
3 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2132 (1998) (identifying “[t]he frequent disparity of power
between the prosecutor and the defendant” as particularly important).
4 See infra Part III (assessing claims of prosecutorial power framed through a
comparison to other criminal justice actors).
5 See Steven Weinberg, Harmful Error: How Prosecutors Cause Wrongful Convictions,
7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 28, 29 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors are the linchpin of the criminal
justice system and certainly the linchpin when it comes to wrongful prosecutions and
wrongful convictions.”); cf. DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S
RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 5 (2012) (“The goal of this book is
not to portray prosecutors as rogue officials indifferent to the conviction of the
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May 2019] THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS 173
ceration,6 and for normative contentions that the road to criminal jus-
tice reform runs through prosecutor offices.7
Prosecutor-power claims have a venerable pedigree. Perhaps the
most famous iteration comes from then-Attorney General Robert
Jackson who stated over seventy-five years ago: “The prosecutor has
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America.”8 Among academic commentators, the iconic Bill Stuntz
probably deserves the most credit. Stuntz famously posited that it is
not legislators and judges, but “prosecutors, who are the criminal jus-
tice system’s real lawmakers.”9 Over the decades, the rest of academia
fell into line.10 Nowadays, the only noteworthy variance arises from
authors’ willingness to embrace ever-increasing hyperbole. No one
bats an eye at scholarly pronouncements like, “prosecutors are the
criminal justice system,”11 “Prosecutors [r]ule the [c]riminal [j]ustice
[s]ystem,”12 or “[p]rosecutors are the ‘Leviathan’ in our criminal jus-
tice system.”13 Many commentators emphasize that it is “difficult to
innocent. . . . [M]ost prosecutors aim to do justice, but only some hit that target
consistently.”).
6 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017) (“Prosecutors have been and remain the
engines driving mass incarceration.”).
7 See, e.g., id. at 146–60 (articulating the need for limiting prosecutorial power and
identifying specific reforms that have been proposed toward this end).
8 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940).
9 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
506 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (discussing the restricted function of
legislators and judges, as compared to prosecutors, by arguing that “[t]he definition of
crimes and defenses plays a . . . much smaller role in the allocation of criminal punishment
than we usually suppose. In general, the role it plays is to empower prosecutors . . . .”); see
also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Plea Bargaining] (“[T]he law that
determines who goes to prison and for how long—is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by
legislators or judges.”); cf. Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577,
632 (2012) (describing William Stuntz’s article on overcriminalization, Pathological
Politics, as “seminal”); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1201 (2015) (explaining the strong influence of Stuntz’s analysis and
noting that “almost every scholar working in the area draws on Stuntz” (footnote
omitted)).
10 See Haugh, supra note 9, at 1201 n.54 (noting that Stuntz’s article has been cited R
more than 600 times and providing prominent examples of leading scholars drawing on his
work).
11 Luna & Wade, supra note 1, at 1285. R
12 Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Preface to THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, at xi (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); see also Jed S. Rakoff,
Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can Be Done About It, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017) (“[F]or the immediate future at least, prosecutors . . . will
be the real rulers of the American criminal justice system.”).
13 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and Agency
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 4 Side B      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 4 Side B      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-APR-19 9:22
174 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:171
overstate the power conferred on prosecutors,”14 but it is not for lack
of trying.
This Article applies a critical lens to the longstanding and increas-
ingly frenetic claims about prosecutorial preeminence. It reveals a
flawed academic consensus enabled by a puzzling lack of dissent.
Without anyone challenging the ever-more-strident rhetoric, scholars’
claims became casual and imprecise. Bold, often-hyperbolic assertions
morphed through sheer repetition into an unshakeable empirical con-
sensus. As a result, today’s prosecutorial-power rhetoric is, upon close
examination, frustratingly incoherent. This is a striking state of affairs
for these are, at base, empirical claims resting comfortably unchal-
lenged in a prominent scholarly literature. Anyone who digs into the
claims finds citations only to similar prosecutor-power claims made by
others. Many roads lead to Stuntz’s “real lawmakers” claim, which
includes no citation at all. When it comes to assertions of prosecutorial
dominance over American criminal justice, it is rhetoric all the way
down.
The academic chorus about prosecutorial preeminence has led, in
recent years, to real-world action. Inspired by the sweeping claims,
criminal justice reformers divert energy and resources from traditional
targets (legislators and judges) to local district attorney elections.15
This resource allocation makes sense if “the prosecutor is the criminal
justice system.”16 It is hard to change a system, but easy to elect a
local prosecutor. And, once a progressive icon like Philadelphia
Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child Protection
Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 757 (2018) (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design
and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869,
874 (2009) (using “The Prosecutor as Leviathan” as the title for a section discussing federal
prosecutorial powers)).
14 David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1341 (2013); see also John F.
Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 575
(2018) (“It is hard to [over]state the power of prosecutors. Granted nearly-unfettered and
nearly-unreviewable discretion, prosecutors determine almost every aspect of a
defendant’s case . . . .”).
15 Cf. Scott Bland, George Soros’ Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO
(Aug. 30, 2016, 5:25 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-
justice-reform-227519 (reporting on the recent influx of money being funnelled into local
DA elections, and noting that this is a shift from traditional efforts aimed at  “advocating
criminal justice policies and legislation that would reduce incarceration rates”); Henry
Gass, Meet a New Breed of Prosecutor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 17, 2017),  https://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meet-a-new-breed-of-prosecutor (noting that
while reform-minded prosecutors are currently a small contingent, “those numbers could
climb as liberal activists such as billionaire George Soros increasingly target DA
elections”).
16 Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413,
1415 (2010).
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District Attorney Larry Krasner is the criminal justice system, the
system’s injustices should melt away.17 Most poignantly, this progres-
sive prosecutor movement leverages the very thing it seeks to
reform—unchecked power. Reformers assign prosecutors the awe-
some task of unilaterally reversing the actions of other criminal justice
actors.18
Putting aside the unflattering optics of scholarly imprecision, the
core substantive problem with this state of affairs is that claims about
prosecutorial power are oversimplified and overstated. As reformers
are finding, the criminal justice system is not a prosecutorial
fiefdom.19 And while the country could use more thoughtful criminal
justice practitioners of every stripe, prosecutors remain just one piece
of a complex puzzle.
Under traditional definitions, a prosecutor’s influence is not even
accurately characterized as “power” at all. Using sociologist Max
Weber’s widely-embraced definition of power as a baseline,20
“‘Power’ . . . is the probability that one actor within a social relation-
ship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance
. . . .”21 The key insight provided by Weber’s definition is that a prose-
cutor’s ability to steer a case to a preferred outcome (e.g., a long
prison term) does not demonstrate prosecutorial power. Power is the
17 See Maura Ewing, A “Completely Unelectable” Progressive Will Probably Win
Philadelphia’s DA Race, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/11/larry-krasner-philadelphia-da/544937 (describing Krasner as the “most
progressive” of the recent wave of reform-minded prosecutors).
18 Cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution 13 (Nov. 2, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with New York University Law Review) (discussing challenges posed
by the progressive prosecution movement to traditional theories of the prosecutorial role).
19 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 2,
2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/02/the-limits-of-prosecutorial-
power (explaining that after Orlando’s elected chief prosecutor announced she would no
longer seek the death penalty, Florida Governor Rick Scott transferred twenty-two of her
cases to another District Attorney); Samantha Melamed, Philly Judges Block DA
Krasner’s Deals for Juvenile Lifers, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.
philly.com/philly/news/crime/krasner-juvenile-lifer-judge-rejecting-deals-20180406.html
(describing judicial rejection of lenient plea offers that Krasner has made to juveniles).
20 See Louise Marie Roth, The Right to Privacy Is Political: Power, the Boundary
Between Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 45, 47 (1999)
(calling Weber’s definition of power the “classic sociological definition” and noting that
other scholars have used it as a foundation for their own definitions of power); Norman
Uphoff, Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at His Word by
Using Resources-Exchange Analysis, 22 POLITY 295, 299 (1989) (“No definition of power
has been more frequently cited than Weber’s . . . .”); cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword:
Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2016) (“‘[P]ower’ in public
law should be understood to refer to the ability of political actors to control the outcomes
of contested decisionmaking processes and secure their preferred policies.”).
21 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1968) (1956).
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176 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:171
ability to achieve that goal when other actors (legislators, judges,
police) resist. Prosecutors rarely exhibit that kind of power. Commen-
tators seem to envision prosecutorial “power” as the far less impres-
sive ability to achieve a result that other equally, or more, powerful
actors enable and endorse. It is the difference between making a
group of people do what you want (power), and facilitating that same
group’s ability to achieve a shared goal (not power). Commentators’
failure to appreciate this distinction muddles our understanding of the
criminal justice system, reducing the likelihood of accurately diag-
nosing problems and decreasing the prospects for meaningful reform.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the most
vacuous prosecutorial-power claims: those that simply assert that
prosecutors have “immense” power. These claims typically fail to
specify the nature of the referenced power (i.e., the power to do
what?) and the degree to which the power can be frustrated by other
actors. Thus, the claims impart little information. Part II discusses the
flaws in failing to particularize prosecutorial-power claims, and
emphasizes the distinctions between federal and state prosecutors to
illustrate this point. The substantial differences between the type of
“power” these actors wield further illustrates the vacuous nature of
prosecutorial-power claims. Part III critiques the most significant
prosecutorial-power claims—sweeping assertions of prosecutorial pre-
eminence. As the discussion reveals, preeminence claims are quite
meaningful, but descriptively false. Part IV builds on the previous
analysis to construct a clearer picture of the “reflective power” of
America’s prosecutors and suggests more constructive ways to think
and talk about these influential actors. Representative quotes from
the vast prosecutor-power literature illustrate the analysis throughout.
I
“PROSECUTORS HAVE LOTS OF POWER”
“[P]rosecutors in the American system wield an immense amount
of power.”
—Eric S. Fish, 201822
This Part discusses the emptiness of the most common genre of
prosecutor power claims: claims that prosecutors have lots of power.
Conclusory statements about unchecked prosecutorial power and dis-
cretion are ubiquitous and uncontroversial. Even prosecutors agree.23
Yet the claims impart virtually no information. The introduction of
22 Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1424 (2018).
23 See, e.g., James P. Fox, We Need to Educate the Media, PROSECUTOR: J. NAT’L
DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 5, 5 (“I believe that America’s prosecutors do
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any precision causes these claims to become either readily refutable or
painfully pedestrian.
At the outset, it is helpful to unpack the claims to understand the
meaning they intend to convey. As explained below, implicit in
generic prosecutor-power claims is the notion that prosecutors possess
free choice (discretion) to impose meaningful consequences over
resistance (power).
To get us started, here is a taste of the genre:
“Prosecutors have enormous power . . . .”24
“It would be difficult to overstate the power conferred on prosecu-
tors . . . .”25
“[P]rosecutors in the American system wield an immense amount of
power.”26
“[P]rosecutors wield tremendous power . . . .”27
“[P]rosecutors have awesome powers . . . .”28
“[P]rosecutors wield so much power . . . .”29
The power is often described as growing:
“[P]rosecutors wield vastly more power than ever before.”30
A common adjunct to assertions about prosecutor power is that
the power is unchecked:
“[P]rosecutors enjoy vast unfettered power . . . .”31
“[P]rosecutors[ ] [have] virtually unchecked powers.”32
“[Prosecutors] really hold all the effective power, reporting to no
one save God . . . .”33
The contention that prosecutorial power is unchecked follows neatly
from the common understanding of power as the ability to achieve a
have a great deal of power.”); Janet Reno, The Importance of Prosecution Training in Law
School, 74 MISS. L.J. xii, xiii (2005) (referring to “the enormous power of a prosecutor”).
24 Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and
Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54 (2012).
25 Uhlmann, supra note 14, at 1341. R
26 Fish, supra note 22, at 1424. R
27 Charles E. MacLean et al., Stop Blaming the Prosecutors: The Real Causes of
Wrongful Convictions and Rightful Exonerations, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 151, 157 (2015).
28 H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2013).
29 Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1365, 1477 (1987).
30 Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992).
31 Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the
Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 738 (1991).
32 Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case
Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 887 (1998).
33 Adam Gopnik, How We Misunderstand Mass Incarceration, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/10/how-we-misunderstand-mass-
incarceration.
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goal against resistance.34 It would be silly to proclaim that prosecutors
have vast power if other actors could routinely check that power. We
would not say, for example, that doctors have enormous power to har-
vest peoples’ organs and then footnote that claim by saying patients
can veto the procedure. To the extent other actors can override doc-
tors’ wishes, doctors have little power worth remarking upon in this
(hypothetical) context. Thus, inherent in the notion of power is the
ability to overcome others’ disagreements with its exercise.35
It is also important to recognize the critical distinction between
prosecutorial power and discretion.36 Claims about prosecutors’ dis-
cretion typically mirror those about prosecutorial power suggesting
substantial overlap in this context:
“American prosecutors exercise almost limitless discretion . . . .”37
“Technically prosecutors have almost unlimited discretion.”38
“[P]rosecutors have essentially unfettered discretion . . . .”39
“[The prosecutor’s] discretion is tremendous.”40
Those who say prosecutors have a lot of power mean that prose-
cutors have the ability to freely choose between different options (i.e.,
discretion). Thus, the already-quoted statements should be under-
stood as shorthand expressions of longer sentiments like this:
“No government official in America has as much unreviewable
power and discretion as the prosecutor.”41
The notion of choosing from a vast array of options (discretion)
distinguishes prosecutors from other officials who are not traditionally
thought to possess remarkable power. The executioner, for example,
could be characterized as wielding awesome power: the power to take
life. But those opposed to capital punishment don’t lobby execu-
tioners because the public servant who physically takes a condemned
prisoner’s life has no discretion. The executioner can kill a few
preselected people, and must do so in a predetermined place, time,
34 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (providing Max Weber’s foundational
definition of power and noting its broad acceptance).
35 See WEBER, supra note 21, at 53. R
36 See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422 (2008) (“I use the term ‘power’ to refer to lawful
authority to take action against an individual. ‘Discretion,’ on the other hand, is the
authority not to exercise power.”).
37 Luna & Wade, supra note 16, at 1414–15. R
38 Nora V. Demleitner, Revisiting the Role of Federal Prosecutors in Times of Mass
Imprisonment, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 169 (2018).
39 Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of
Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008).
40 Jackson, supra note 8, at 3. R
41 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009).
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 9 26-APR-19 9:22
May 2019] THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS 179
and manner. A similar analysis can be done for jailors, who have the
power to lock people away, but no discretion to select the targets of
that power.
Discretion is not the same as power. For discretion to matter, the
choices available to an actor must have a substantial impact. This dis-
tinction can be illustrated by reference to still other criminal justice
actors who have great discretion but little power. For example, the
courtroom clerk has vast discretion in selecting the order of cases to
call on the day’s calendar. But since the exercise of this unchecked
discretion has a relatively minor impact on individuals’ lives, it is com-
fortably left unregulated. In criminal justice parlance, all of these
actors—the executioner, the jailor, the court clerk—have little power.
Prosecutors are different.
Notice, then, that most shorthand statements about prosecutorial
power encompass the longer form statements about unchecked power
and discretion. All of these statements are saying the same thing.
Claims that prosecutors have great power imply that they have broad
discretion to make consequential decisions that other actors cannot
override.
Armed with this broad understanding of the nature of the most
common species of prosecutor power claims, we can begin our cri-
tique. The first point highlights these claims’ imprecision. All of the
above-quoted claims trade on a critical ambiguity for their rhetorical
effectiveness.  They do not tell us what the prosecutor has the power
to do. Assertions of the breadth of prosecutorial power can only be
evaluated if they specify a contemplated action. The chef’s power to
select the soup of the day is not the same thing as the President’s
power to start a war. Further, power claims should connect the con-
templated action to a real-world consequence. Both the Prince of
Liechtenstein and the President of the United States can start a war—
but starting a war is less meaningful than successfully waging one.
That means that only one of these world leaders wields enormous
power.
Statements about prosecutorial power superficially benefit from
obscuring the form of power they address. It is easy to say prosecutors
have lots of power. So do police officers, judges, and legislators. Res-
taurant inspectors,42 school teachers,43 social media influencers,44 and
42 See Priya Krishna, The Life of a Restaurant Inspector: Rising Grades, Fainting
Owners, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/dining/restaurant-
health-inspector.html (“The most feared and loathed character in the city’s restaurant
business is not the critic, or the landlord. It’s the health inspector.”).
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news anchors45 have great power. Jailors do too, if we think about the
power to determine conditions of imprisonment. That is why claims
about power only communicate valuable information when they are
connected to a specific function. To assess these claims requires some
precision about the contemplated action and its consequences. And,
as we will see, the introduction of this kind of specificity immediately
complicates descriptive claims about “immense” prosecutorial power.
Take two common claims:
“Prosecutors possess extraordinary power to charge defendants.”46
“[P]rosecutors have ended up with almost unfettered, unreviewable
power to determine who gets sent to prison and for how long.”47
The first claim is narrow and defensible. It limits the universe of
possible prosecutorial targets to “defendants,” recognizing that prose-
cutors typically cannot select targets at will from the population at
large. The core prosecutorial function is deciding how to process the
large number, but small percentage, of the overall population brought
to their attention by police. We could still quibble about the role of
the grand jury in charging felony cases,48 or indirect constraints on
43 See Jenny Edwards, Teachers: The Most Powerful People in the World!, NAT’L
EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/grants/62734.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (“[Teachers]
are the most powerful people in the world! In your hands, you hold the future of society.”).
44 See Jelle Fastenau, Under the Influence: The Power of Social Media Influencers,
MEDIUM (Mar. 6, 2018), https://medium.com/crobox/under-the-influence-the-power-of-
social-media-influencers-5192571083c3 (using consumer psychology to explain why social
media influencers are in an authoritative position and have the ability to shape their
followers’ opinions).
45 See Mike Conway, The Origins of the All-Powerful News Anchor, CONVERSATION
(Feb. 25, 2015, 5:56 AM), http://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-the-all-powerful-news-
anchor-37874 (“An anchor’s perceived ability to bring viewers to the newscast trumped
even the authority of the network news presidents, so the main anchor not only controlled
the newscast, but also had heavy influence over the network news operation.”).
46 Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal
Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015) (citing WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 257–61 (2011)); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 43
(1988) (“Prosecutors have unlimited discretion not to charge, and when they do proceed,
they have largely unlimited power to determine which charges to file.”). For an example of
a carefully limited claim, see Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process,
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 778 (2016), writing that “it is hard to dispute that prosecutors
generally have broad power to decline to bring charges and that they use that power
sometimes.”
47 PFAFF, supra note 6, at 70. R
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”);
see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 703, 707 n.5 (2008) (“[A]bout half of the fifty states have some form of
grand jury requirement.” (citing SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.2 (2d ed. 2005)).
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charging decisions like judicial dismissals.49 And, of course, prosecu-
tors can only charge someone with recognized, typically statutory,
offenses.50 But basically, the first claim set out above is descriptively
correct. A prosecutor has discretion to choose whether to charge a
defendant with a crime and what crime to select. And within broad
boundaries, the charging decision typically cannot be overruled by the
courts or other actors, such as victims or police.
Yet if we are assessing prosecutorial power, the second claim set
out above is the one that matters. There is a reason observers label the
most significant criminal justice crisis of modern times “mass incarcer-
ation” and not “mass charging.”51 Those who rightly worry about the
criminal justice system’s severity are primarily thinking about convic-
tions and sentences (as well as pretrial incarceration).52 Assertions of
prosecutorial power to control these phenomena are more meaningful
but also readily rebutted. As I have explained elsewhere, “it takes a
village” to send someone to prison.53 The track is laid by legislators
and passes through critical gateways controlled by police, judges, and
other actors.54 A journey on that track begins when the police arrest a
person and deliver the case to the prosecutor for a charging decision.
But no punishment may be imposed until a jury convicts or the defen-
49 See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017) (“Nineteen
states have given trial courts the power to dismiss prosecutions for the sake of justice.”).
50 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author) (highlighting the enduring
legacy of judicial common law crime creation and noting that “[j]udicial crime creation is
still explicitly permitted in several states”); see also Stith, supra note 36, at 1430 R
(“[E]videntiary and resource constraints necessarily limit the charges that a prosecutor can
bring in any given case.”).
51 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 12–13 (2011) (identifying “mass incarceration” as the New Jim
Crow); JEREMY  TRAVIS ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1
(2014) (reporting on a comprehensive study designed to explain why “the rate of
incarceration in the United States more than quadrupled in the past four decades”).
52 See, e.g., Zina Makar, Displacing Due Process, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 430 (2018)
(focusing on contribution of pretrial incarceration to mass incarceration). Even pretrial
incarceration depends on a judicial determination pursuant to legislative authorization.
See, e.g., SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
BAIL IN AMERICA’S SYSTEM 40–41 (2018) (describing various practices across jurisdictions
by which a judge will determine whether to set bail or to deny release altogether).
53 Bellin, supra note 2, at 837. R
54 See id.; see also Philadelphia DA Wants to Dismantle Mass Incarceration from the
Inside out, WBUR: HERE & NOW (Apr. 18, 2018, 2:55 PM), http://www.wbur.org/
hereandnow/2018/04/18/philadelphia-da-larry-krasner-incarceration (“We have a 700
percent increase in incarceration in Pennsylvania, and it is because a bunch of legislators—
many of whom had never been lawyers, nor had they ever been in criminal justice—were
getting votes by preying off of fear and demanding high sentences.” (quoting Philadelphia
District Attorney Larry Krasner)).
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dant agrees, with judicial approval, to plead guilty. And even then, a
judge (or legislature) selects the punishment. Of course, we can
debate the nuances of all of this, but that is the point. Once we con-
nect prosecutor power to a meaningful consequence, the ubiquitous,
unchallenged empirical claims about prosecutor’s “enormous”55
power become vulnerable.56 Proponents of these claims avoid the con-
test altogether by alluding to power generally and adding jaw-drop-
ping adjectives (“awesome”)57 to assure skeptical readers of the
certainty of the observation.
Sending someone to prison is a consequential impact, and if pros-
ecutors have the ability to do that without constraint, then prosecutors
are the criminal justice system. But that is a big “if.” The claim
depends on an assessment of the power of other criminal justice
actors, and particularly the ability of prosecutors to place people in
prison against resistance. After a constructive detour to highlight
important distinctions between different types of prosecutors, this crit-
ical interplay between criminal justice actors takes center stage in Part
III.
II
FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL POWER: A CASE STUDY IN
CASE SELECTION
“Federal prosecutors wield enormous power.”
—Rachel E. Barkow, 200958
Prosecutorial powers vary by jurisdiction. For example, many
claims about prosecutorial power highlight the prosecutorial screening
function, but in some jurisdictions, police file cases directly with the
courts.59 Another place that commentators find great prosecutorial
power is in plea bargaining. Yet in some jurisdictions, judges compete
55 Leonetti, supra note 24, at 54 (arguing that because of their unchallenged discretion R
in choosing whom to charge, prosecutors have “enormous power in determining who is
subjected to criminal punishment”).
56 Cf. Don Stemen & Gipsy Escobar, Whither the Prosecutor? Prosecutor and County
Effects on Guilty Plea Outcomes in Wisconsin, 35 JUST. Q. 1166 (2019) (“Overall, the
analyses find little effect of prosecutor-level variables on guilty plea outcomes.”).
57 Caldwell, supra note 28, at 54 (positing as one of “[t]wo truths” that “prosecutors R
have awesome powers”).
58 Barkow, supra note 13, at 869. R
59 In some jurisdictions “police automatically file all felony arrests with the lower court
before the prosecutor has an opportunity to screen.” BARBARA BOLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE
PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS 1988, at 7 (1992). In those jurisdictions, “nearly all
arrests result in initial charges being filed with the court.” Id. at 5; see also Alexandra
Natapoff, When the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/police-prosecutors-misdemeanors.html (“In
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with prosecutors to offer plea deals.60 To be fair, generalizing about
prosecutors is necessary to have a coherent conversation. But as this
Part highlights, any claim about “American prosecutors”61 obscures
important distinctions, and these distinctions reveal the elusive nature
of prosecutor power claims.
Sophisticated takes on prosecutors identify specific types of
prosecutors:
“All sides agree that for good or ill, federal prosecutors exercise
vast discretion. . . .”62
“It is hard to overstate the power of federal prosecutors.”63
“Like criminal prosecutors, family-court prosecutors have immense
power.”64
“District attorneys in California have tremendous power . . . .”65
The most salient distinction between types of American prosecu-
tors are between federal and state prosecutors. If pushed on the ques-
tion, most commentators would assert that federal prosecutors are
more powerful than state prosecutors.66 But, again, such claims are
riddled with imprecision. Conclusory references to the “awesome
power” of federal prosecutors overlook important limitations. The
most obvious limit is jurisdictional. A federal prosecutor can only
hundreds of misdemeanor courts in at least 14 states, police officers can file criminal
charges and handle court cases, acting as prosecutor as well as witness and negotiator.”),
60 Cf. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 326
(2016) (describing robust judicial involvement in plea negotiations in ten states); Justin
Fenton, In Baltimore’s Reception Court, a Behind-the-Scenes Look at How Plea Deals
Happen, BALT. SUN (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/
bs-md-ci-baltimore-plea-bargains-peters-20171023-htmlstory.html (profiling active judicial
involvement in plea negotiations in Baltimore).
61 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 46, at 782 (emphasizing the broad discretion of “American R
prosecutors”); Fish, supra note 22, at 1424 (stating that “prosecutors in the American R
system wield an immense amount of power”).
62 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 856 (2007).
63 Barkow, supra note 13, at 870. R
64 Gupta-Kagan, supra note 13, at 743. R
65 ACLU Founds. of Cal., What Makes a DA So Powerful?, MEET YOUR DA, https://
meetyourda.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
66 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 278
(2011) (documenting enormous state prosecutor caseloads and explaining that “federal
prosecutors have vastly greater resources than their state counterparts”); Daniel C.
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611 (2005) (contrasting federal with state
prosecutors and concluding that “[l]ittle responsibility and vast jurisdiction mean that
federal law enforcers must exercise an extraordinary degree of investigative and
prosecutorial discretion in deciding when, and against whom, to invoke that jurisdiction”).
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prosecute individuals for federal crimes.67 Absent an applicable sec-
tion of the United States Code, a federal prosecutor cannot prosecute
even serious offenses like murder.68 This limit reflects a general
restriction on all prosecutors’ power—their powers depend on an
enforceable statute enacted by the legislature. This gives legislatures a
preemptive veto on prosecutorial power, which is part of the subject
matter of Part III.69
Federal caseloads reflect the statutory limits on federal jurisdic-
tion. Federal prosecutions target mostly immigration (50%) and drug
(17%) offenses.70 This means that federal prosecutors have little
power over the vast bulk of criminal defendants. For example, federal
prosecutors wield little power over a person who robs a restaurant in
Los Angeles, except if that person was previously deported71 or is car-
rying drugs (or committed some other federal offense).72 The con-
sensus about federal prosecutorial power overlooks this critical
limitation. It focuses instead only on prosecutors’ power within a
narrow jurisdictional sphere. This makes the federal prosecutor
appear quite powerful. Think of the federal prosecutor as a spider
exercising enormous power over those caught in its web, and little
power over anything else.
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (reserving authority to prosecute violations of federal law
to the Department of Justice); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (explaining that
the states’ “powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate and
independent sources of power and authority originally belonging to them before admission
to the Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment”); Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (“The States under our federal system have the principal
responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes.”). Federal statutes sometimes expressly
incorporate state offenses. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 158 (1998)
(interpreting the Assimilative Crimes Act which incorporates state offenses into federal
law to allow federal prosecutions of certain state crimes on “federal enclaves such as Army
bases”).
68 This limitation  recently arose in Virginia, when a state prosecutor  accidentally
dismissed a murder case, and federal prosecutors declined to prosecute the case to correct
the error, stating that the case “did not meet the criteria to try it in federal court.” See Jane
Harper, Virginia Beach Prosecutor Says Office Botched Murder Case, Setting a Man Free,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Mar. 5, 2018), https://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/article_78260
d84-1859-544e-a5d3-5d5f09157f09.html.
69 See infra Part III (discussing the interplay between prosecutors and other powerful
criminal justice actors).
70 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014—STATISTICAL TABLES 9
fig.2.1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf (showing “Suspects in
matters received by U.S. attorneys, by offense, October 1, 2013–September 30, 2014”).
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (setting forth a criminal offense for reentry of removed
aliens).
72 See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012) (prohibiting possession of controlled substances). Federal
prosecutions of violent crimes (three percent of federal prosecutions) are rare. See
MOTIVANS, supra note 70, at tbl.2.1. R
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The spider metaphor illustrates another key aspect of the aura of
prosecutorial power: target selection. Observers view prosecutors as
powerful because they typically succeed in the cases they prosecute.73
But that success is inflated by the prosecution’s ability to choose its
cases.74 The spider wins most of the fights it gets into too, but only by
carefully choosing its opponents. When a deer (as opposed to a but-
terfly) stumbles into the spider’s web, the spider takes a hard pass and
makes a new web somewhere else.
The ability to win most contests by unilaterally choosing when to
play is particularly exaggerated among federal prosecutors. Most fed-
eral prosecutions are easy to “win” because they are police-initiated,
meaning federal officers are typically the key witnesses and, in concert
with federal prosecutors, generate the kind of evidence that will hold
up in court. (If they can’t generate sufficient evidence through the aid
of law enforcement, prosecutors typically do not proceed with the
case.) The cases are also typically straightforward, without the twists
and turns that populate civilian-initiated cases (e.g., property and vio-
lent crimes). It is easy to prove common federal crimes such as that a
previously deported person was “found in . . . the United States,”75
possessed a firearm despite a previous felony conviction,76 or pos-
sessed a large quantity of drugs.77 It is hard to prove that the same
person robbed a restaurant, or sexually assaulted an acquaintance
(state crimes). Federal prosecutors also have free reign to defer diffi-
cult, but important cases to state prosecutors.78 In short, by weeding
out the cases in which they foresee an inability to overcome resis-
73 Even excluding guilty pleas, conviction rates at trial are high. See Jeffrey Bellin, The
Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 411 (2018) (“For example, in California the rate of
conviction at trial in felony cases is reportedly higher than 80%; in Florida it is around
73%.”).
74 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
75 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (2012).
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
77 See, e.g., MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS
IN FEDERAL COURT 114 (2016) (describing how the structure of federal drug charges
makes them easy to prove).
78 See, e.g., id. at 113 (arguing that “federal prosecutors are not generally in the
business of bringing weaker cases,” but instead bring “‘the pick of the litter’ cases”); Eric
Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations
(“This means that federal prosecutors cannot—and should not—bring every case or charge
every defendant who stands accused of violating federal law. Some issues are best handled
at the state or local level.”).
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tance, federal prosecutors maintain an inflated air of invulnerability. If
a case is destined to fail, prosecutors don’t apply their awesome power
to obtain a conviction. They drop the case like it’s hot and search for
an easier target.
The fragile nature of federal prosecutorial power can be illus-
trated by the effect of placing federal prosecutors in state court—the
prosecutorial equivalent of kryptonite. Federal prosecutors handle all
non-traffic criminal offenses in one of the nation’s largest cities, the
District of Columbia.79 These federal prosecutors resemble state pros-
ecutors. They get to charge the whole panoply of criminal offenses,
like robbery and murder. And, like other state prosecutors, they rou-
tinely lose cases they pursue. In 2016, for example, only 42% of the
12,537 defendants in the D.C. United States Attorney’s Office’s cases
pled guilty, while 53% had their cases dismissed post-filing.80 Across
the river in the Eastern District of Virginia, their fully federalized col-
leagues convicted nearly all of the 961 people they prosecuted (prima-
rily via guilty pleas), with only a 4% post-filing dismissal rate.81
Thus, the perception that federal prosecutors wield great power
depends on a spectacular home court advantage in a small jurisdic-
tional sphere, where resistance is most easily overcome. State prosecu-
tors look very different, presiding over a broader scope of cases,82 but
struggling to overcome more frequent resistance. State prosecutors
have greater flexibility to choose from a broader menu of charges.
This gives state prosecutors more discretion in selecting a charge, and
thus (presumably) more power. Yet, as prosecutors of last resort, state
prosecutors possess less discretion to decline charges altogether.83
79 About Us, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., D.C., https://www.justice.gov/usao-
dc/about-us (last visited Dec. 23, 2018) (“We are responsible not only for the prosecution
of all federal crimes, but also for the prosecution of all serious local crime committed by
adults in the District of Columbia.”).
80 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT
65 tbl.17 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/988896/download (reporting 5273
guilty pleas, 139 jury convictions, 527 court trial convictions, and 6598 dismissals out of
12,537 total case “dispositions” in 2016; 7044 arrests “declined” are listed separately).
81 Id. at 7 tbl.2A. The table does not break down the exact percentage of convictions
obtained by guilty plea as opposed to a trial verdict, but it reports that 919 defendants were
found guilty and only 69 cases tried. Id. This means the minimum percentage of defendants
found guilty via a guilty plea (even assuming every trial resulted in a conviction) is 92.5%
(850 out of 919). Id.
82 See, e.g., LYNCH, supra note 77, at 112–14 (describing the different jurisdictional R
scope and bargaining power of state and federal prosecutors).
83 Compare Justice Manual § 9-27.200, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-
9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200 (last updated Feb. 2018) (describing the
broad discretion a federal prosecutor has to decline cases), with Bennett L. Gershman,
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
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And state prosecutors’ power to convict defendants is tempered
by the difficulty of securing convictions for many state crimes.84 As a
result, state prosecutors encounter more robust resistance from
judges, juries, and defendants, and struggle to overcome this
resistance.85
And when resistance from any corner becomes (or is likely to be)
sufficiently substantial, prosecutors of all stripes drop the case, suffer
a dismissal, or bargain around it.86 Since state prosecutors have to do
this more frequently (and more publicly), they look less powerful than
their federal counterparts, but that is largely a result of case selection.
So what is the answer: Are federal prosecutors more powerful than
state prosecutors? It depends. Do either possess “awesome” power?
Go back to Part I. (And then meet me at Part III.)
III
“PROSECUTORS ARE PREEMINENT”
“The institution of the prosecutor has more power than any other
in the criminal justice system.”
—Jason Kreag, 201787
Because power is the ability to achieve one’s goals against resis-
tance, assessing prosecutorial power claims requires a comparison of
prosecutors to other criminal justice actors. This is why the most
meaningful claims about prosecutorial power involve implicit or
explicit claims of prosecutorial preeminence. The most famous
example is the already-quoted statement by Attorney General
Jackson: “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and repu-
tation than any other person in America.”88 Jackson’s quote is unusual
in extending its scope to all other persons (e.g., even the President).
More typically, these claims limit their scope to the criminal justice
universe:
1259, 1263–64 (2011) (describing the more extensive guidelines set forth in the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards).
84 See LYNCH, supra note 77, at 112–13 (highlighting caseload pressures, variable “case R
quality,” and sentencing leniency in state as opposed to federal court that result in
defendants obtaining favorable plea offers).
85 See, e.g., id. (describing how prosecutors may face pressure from judges); Gershman,
supra note 83, at 1277–79 (describing the sorts of pressure prosecutors may face from the R
community and potential jury pool).
86 See Bellin, supra note 2, at 846 (chronicling studies of prosecutorial screening R
behavior that found that prosecutors proceeded on about half and, in some cases,
substantially less than half of felony arrests); cf. LYNCH, supra note 77, at 112–13 R
(describing challenges state prosecutors face in the plea negotiation process).
87 Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 771 (2017).
88 Jackson, supra note 8. R
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“As every lawyer knows, the prosecutor is the most powerful figure
in the American criminal justice system.”89
“There is little doubt that prosecutors are the most powerful and
influential actors in the American criminal justice system.”90
“Prosecutors are usually conceded to be the most powerful actors in
the criminal justice drama . . . .”91
“[C]riminal law scholars frequently view prosecutors as the most
powerful actors in the system.”92
“No serious observer disputes that prosecutors . . . hold most of the
power in the United States criminal justice system.”93
“[Prosecutors] are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice
system.”94
These assertions pack a rhetorical punch. Again, however, they trade
on ambiguity.
Claims of prosecutorial primacy build on the lack of specificity
about “power” already highlighted in Part I. Even if we provide some
precision, by assuming, for example, that the claims refer to prosecu-
tors’ ability to obtain their desired criminal justice outcomes, uncer-
tainty remains. Prosecutorial preeminence claims typically leverage
uncertainty about the unit of comparison and the universe of compa-
rators. Many assessments of prosecutorial primacy quietly omit legis-
latures and police, two of the most powerful criminal justice actors.
Others fail to specify the level of comparison. As we will see, these are
critical omissions. Once all players are included, and the unit of com-
parison fixed, prosecutorial primacy becomes hazy at best.
The most basic complications of claims of prosecutorial preemi-
nence center on the comparators. The complexity operates on two dif-
ferent axes: (1) what is the unit of comparison; and (2) who is included
in the competition. Let’s start with the first. Statements about
89 Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in the Criminal Justice System:
The Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1990, at 2, 3.
90 Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability, 21
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 579 (2017).
91 Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, Research on Bias in Judicial Sentencing, 26 N.M. L.
REV. 107, 113 (1996).
92 Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 960
(2018).
93 Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 678 (2016).
94 Fish, supra note 22, at 1444; see also MEDWED, supra note 5, at 2 (“Prosecutors are R
the most powerful players in the criminal justice system . . . .”); PFAFF, supra note 6, at 133 R
(“[P]rosecutors [are] the most powerful actors in the entire criminal justice system.”); K.
Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened
Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 288 (2014) (“[T]he prosecutor [is]
the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system . . . .”); Robert L. Misner, Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (1996) (“[T]he
prosecutor [is] the preeminent actor in the system . . . .”).
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prosecutorial power can leverage the ambiguity in comparators by
suggesting that all prosecutors have more power than, for example,
individual legislators or judges. That is not a fair comparison. If a
claim of prosecutorial power depends on the actions of all prosecutors
in a given jurisdiction, the equivalent comparison is to all of that juris-
diction’s police, judges, or legislators. Thus, a more precise claim
would be something along these lines:
“The prosecutor’s office has become the most powerful office in the
criminal justice system.”95
Another approach is to look not at prosecutors or their offices,
but at the prosecutorial role:
“The institution of the prosecutor has more power than any other in
the criminal justice system.”96
Here, we would compare the institution or role of the prosecutor in
the abstract to other analogues.
More commonly, commentators use words like “officials” or
“actors.” These terms typically speak to individual prosecutors acting
as a collective:
“[P]rosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice
system, bar none.”97
“U.S. prosecutors are arguably the most powerful officials in the
U.S. criminal justice system . . . .”98
“[P]rosecutors are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice
system.”99
“[T]he most powerful party in the criminal justice system [is] the
prosecutor.”100
“No government official in America has as much unreviewable
power and discretion as the prosecutor.”101
95 Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging
Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 403 (2000).
96 Kreag, supra note 87, at 771. R
97 Angela J. Davis, The Prosecution of Black Men, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN:
ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 178 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017); see also
Angela J. Davis, In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 832 (2013) (“Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the
criminal justice system.”).
98 Marie Gottschalk, Bring It on: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and
American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 574 (2015) (referring to federal and state
prosecutors).
99 Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785,
795 (2012).
100 Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 304 (2017).
101 Bibas, supra note 41. R
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“[P]rosecutors are considered to be the most influential players in
the criminal justice process.”102
Even when a prosecutorial-power claim addresses an individual
prosecutor, it is still important to identify the contemplated level. Are
we talking about the chief prosecutor, such as an elected District
Attorney, or a line prosecutor? Each unit should be compared to its
analogue. Commentators should compare, for example, District
Attorneys to Chiefs of Police, and line attorneys to individual police
officers. A line prosecutor’s power is, obviously, limited by hierarchies
within the office and the vagaries of case assignment.103 To the extent
office policies dictate the most meaningful decisions, or require
approval for deviations from fixed policies, line prosecutors end up
with severely limited power. A chief prosecutor can overcome these
limits, but is restricted by geographic jurisdiction, as well as the chal-
lenges of making line prosecutors conform to office policies.104
A second, more important ambiguity arises when we try to deter-
mine who is included in the competition. The broadest pool of con-
tenders includes legislators, judges, police, defense attorneys, and
prosecutors. We might also include governors, parole boards, mayors,
and probation officers. Indeed, some prosecutorial-power claims seem
intended to capture every possibility:
“American criminal justice is a largely administrative system run by
prosecutors.”105
“For all intents and purposes, prosecutors are the criminal justice
system . . . .”106
Other comparisons reach out to include even non-human actors:
“[P]rosecutors [are] the most powerful entity in the criminal justice
system . . . .”107
Sometimes the competition appears to be limited to only courtroom
actors—judges, juries, prosecutors, and defense attorneys:
102 Carlos Berdejo´, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1187, 1197 (2018).
103 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 41, at 1000–02 (describing the effect of prosecutorial R
office structures on outcomes).
104 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1352 n.97 (2008) (recognizing the “classic principal-agent
problem that is internal to the prosecutor’s office”).
105 Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 GA. L. REV. 693, 709 n.62 (2017).
106 Luna & Wade, supra note 1, at 1285. R
107 Michael Pinard, A Reentry-Centered Vision of Criminal Justice, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
103, 104 (2007).
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“Prosecutors have replaced jurors and judges as the most powerful
players in the criminal trial . . . .”108
“[P]rosecutors are the most powerful players in the judicial
system.”109
“[T]he most powerful repeat players in the criminal system [are
prosecutors] . . . .”110
“[P]rosecutors, rather than judges, now effectively determine the
sentences to be imposed in most cases.”111
Other comparisons only include prosecutors and other attorneys:
“Prosecutors are the most powerful lawyers . . . .”112
“[P]rosecutors wield extraordinary power in comparison to private
lawyers . . . .”113
Artificial limitations of the field of competitors make huge differ-
ences in the significance of the claims. Consequently, commentators
should note whom their comparisons exclude, especially if the claims
exclude police and legislators, two of the most powerful criminal jus-
tice actors.114 Clarity is critical because once burdened with precision,
prosecutorial preeminence claims become difficult to maintain. The
problem becomes clear once we dispatch with prosecutors versus the
ambiguous field comparisons and explore head-to-head matchups.
A. Prosecutors Versus Police Officers
If I wanted to influence criminal justice outcomes and could con-
trol either police or prosecutors, I would choose police. Police officers
have an enormous advantage by virtue of their status as first movers.
Police (not prosecutors) conduct stings, make traffic stops, and
respond to 911 calls.115 Prosecutors, by contrast, have little ability to
detect crime. It is true that a prosecutor can decline to pursue a
108 Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Teaching the Carceral Crisis: An Ethical and Pedagogical
Imperative, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 104, 120 (2013).
109 Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 535 (2012).
110 Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 440
(2007).
111 Rakoff, supra note 12, at 1432. R
112 Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 626 (1999).
113 Arnold I. Burns et al., Curbing Prosecutorial Excess: A Job for the Courts &
Congress, CHAMPION, July 1998, https://www.nacdl.org/champion/articles/98jul01.htm.
114 See generally Bellin, supra note 19 (explaining the crucial roles of the police in R
decisions about enforcement and the legislature in changing the criminal justice system).
115 Officer Expectations and Duties, UNC POLICE, https://police.unc.edu/recruitment/
officer-expectations-duties (last visited Oct. 29, 2018); cf. Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue
Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305, 306 (2018)
(“Policing is central to the operation of the modern criminal law, and yet, it has long been
almost entirely ignored by criminal law theorists.”).
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matter, but a police officer can do that too by letting a suspect off with
a warning (or a nod) with much less of a paper trail.116
Police dominate cases before they get to court, well before other
officials get involved.117 This gives them great freedom to operate
outside the justice system—something prosecutors generally lack.
Police can choose whom to investigate, how to investigate, how many
resources to commit, and whether to bring the fruits of any investiga-
tion to a court (via a prosecutor). Since most crimes go unsolved
(barely half of homicides result in an arrest),118 the decision of
whether and to what degree to deploy police resources to detect and
investigate an offense may be the most significant criminal justice
decision of all. Police control the initial record of the case by choosing
what to document, who to question, and what to ask. Police officers
lay their hands on people, and interrogate them for hours in back
rooms, isolated and without access to the outside world.119
Police-civilian interactions are unconstrained in the moment by
judges or prosecutors. Rather, judicial actors review these interac-
tions, if at all, long after the fact.120 Police influence continues
throughout the proceedings. Police are often the primary witnesses in
criminal trials, and also play a critical role in urging (and compelling)
civilian witnesses to testify.121 If a defendant or witness fails to appear
at court, judges and prosecutors rely on law enforcement to compel
attendance.122
116 See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(b) (4th ed. 2017)
(“[I]t is clear beyond question that discretion is regularly exercised by the police in
deciding when to arrest and that such decisions have a profound effect upon prosecution
policy.”).
117 See generally What Are Some Common Steps of a Criminal Investigation and
Prosecution?, LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST. (Apr. 15, 2010),
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/details/story.php?id=
5498 (explaining the stages of an investigation/prosecution and where the prosecuting
attorney may get involved).
118 Unsolved Homicide Database, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2018/investigations/unsolved-homicide-database (last updated July 24, 2018)
(noting that nationally only fifty percent of homicides result in an arrest).
119 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (summarizing interrogation
practices).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209, 212–14 (5th Cir. 2017) (reviewing
legality of a search a year and a half after incident in question); United States v. Rivera,
152 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D. Mass. 2001) (reviewing interaction in a suppression hearing
nearly a year after arrest).
121 Officer Expectations and Duties, supra note 115; see also David Kocieniewski, R
Keeping Witnesses off Stand to Keep Them Safe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/nyregion/19witness.html (explaining a shift in policy of some
police forces regarding pressuring witnesses to testify).
122 See Howard M. Livingston, Criminal Law and Procedure; Service of Subpoenas for
the Attendance of Witnesses; G.S. § 15A-801; G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 45, N.C. DEP’T JUST. (Mar.
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 14 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 14 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 23 26-APR-19 9:22
May 2019] THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS 193
Perhaps the most notorious recent example of independent police
power comes from New York City. For years, the New York City
Police Department (NYPD) stopped and arrested hundreds of
thousands of New Yorkers on suspicion of minor crimes in an effort
(they said) to deter and detect public gun carrying.123 As most of these
stops did not uncover guns, the policing surge sent a wave of minor
cases (subway fare evasion, trespassing, marijuana possession) to the
courts. From the outset, prosecutors dismissed almost all of these
cases, many of which would not stand up in court.124 The NYPD did
not blink. It continued its gun-deterring program of mass stops and
arrests for minor offenses year after year, until a judge and newly-
elected progressive mayor ordered the NYPD to desist.125 To people
living in New York City from 2003 to 2013, it sure looked like police,
not prosecutors, ran the show.126
Another distinction that highlights the power of police is the
power to take life.127 In a jurisdiction with the death penalty, a prose-
cutor can bring a capital case against a defendant accused of a quali-
22, 1978), https://www.ncdoj.gov/About-DOJ/Legal-Services/Legal-Opinions/Opinions/
Criminal-Law-and-Procedure;-Service-of-Subpoenas-f.aspx (explaining role of law
enforcement agencies in subpoena process). See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 17
(enumerating the subpoena process and requirements).
123 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing
New York Police Department (NYPD) “Stop and Frisk” practices in ruling them
unconstitutional); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality
and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–20
(2014) (chronicling the history of “Stop and Frisk”).
124 See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 173–74 (2018) (explaining
that the “common experience” for those caught up in NYPD’s policing surge was to
“experience a series of arrests” but no convictions); Bellin, supra note 123, at 1532 (“As R
arrests increased, the rate at which prosecutors declined to pursue these cases rose
dramatically.”).
125 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (ordering NYPD to change their policing practices); see
also Bellin, supra note 123 (chronicling NYPD’s prior tactics over the period). R
126 In a careful study of the chaotic workings of New York City misdemeanor courts,
Issa Kohler-Hausmann interprets the mass dismissal of these cases as prosecutors
“marking” defendants for closer scrutiny should they eventually accumulate a substantial
number of arrests. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 124, at 144–45. As “[m]arks are an R
unavoidable part of case processing,” id. at 175, another way to look at these events is that
since the NYPD did not care if the cases were prosecuted, prosecutor decisionmaking had
no impact on a “stop and frisk” phenomenon exclusively generated and maintained by the
NYPD. See Bellin, supra note 123, at 1531–32 (explaining that while the number of stops R
skyrocketed, a small percentage led to arrests, convictions, or sentencings).
127 See Jillian K. Swencionis & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Psychological Science of Racial
Bias and Policing, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 398, 405 (2017) (“When has there been
enough training, ‘practice,’ or expertise developed to trust someone with the power to take
away someone’s life or liberty—and to do so equitably?”).
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fying murder.128 If the jury convicts and imposes a death sentence, the
courts (federal and state) do not reverse the sentence on appeal, and
the governor concurs, the state may eventually execute the defen-
dant.129 In 2017, there were 23 executions in the United States.130 A
police officer can unilaterally decide to shoot someone dead on the
street;131 police killed 987 people in 2017.132
B. Prosecutors Versus Judges
Again, if seeking to make an impact on the criminal justice
system, and forced to pick between prosecutors and judges, I would go
with judges every day of the week (except weekends when the courts
are closed). Individual judges dominate courtroom proceedings. Once
a case is filed, a judge decides whether and how that case progresses.
Judges set pretrial release conditions,133 approve (or reject) plea bar-
gains,134 empanel and instruct juries,135 rule on evidence,136 control
the flow of cases,137 and much more.138 A particularly crafty judge
could undermine a prosecution simply by declining to call a case in a
predictable fashion. Even if a defendant obtains favorable treatment
from a prosecutor and receives a sentence of probation or is diverted
128 See Stephen McAllister, Federal Constitutional Requirements Governing Trial,
Sentencing and Direct Review in Capital Cases, 64 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 20, 21 (1995)
(explaining the Kansas statute that limits the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty by creating specific requirements for the offense of capital murder).
129 See Death Penalty Appeals Process , CAP. PUNISHMENT CONTEXT, https://
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess (last visited Oct. 30, 2018)
(explaining the process of appealing a death penalty).
130 Execution List 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
execution-list-2017 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
131 See, e.g., Associated Press, When Are Police Justified in Using Deadly Force?, L.A.
TIMES (July 13, 2016, 1:49 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-police-
deadly-force-20160711-snap-story.html (describing when police are justified in using
deadly force).
132 Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-
shootings-2017 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
133 See BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 52, at 40–41 (discussing process for setting R
bail conditions).
134 See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 19 (explaining how judge rejected some deals offered R
by prosecutor); Lacie Pierson, Federal Judge Rejects Third Plea Deal in a Year in WV,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/
cops_and_courts/federal-judge-rejects-third-plea-deal-in-a-year-in/article_4970f4b3-2282-
51f8-ac0e-fa8e27a73d8e.html (same).
135 The Judge and the Jury, JUD. LEARNING CTR., https://judiciallearningcenter.org/the-
judge-and-the-jury (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
136 Role of the Judge and Other Courtroom Participants, U.S. DISTRICT CT. N. DISTRICT
FLA., http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/role-judge-and-other-courtroom-participants (last
visited Dec. 23, 2018).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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to a drug court, it is a judge who assesses the defendant’s compliance
and, if unsatisfied, sends the defendant to jail.139 Judges decide
whether to issue warrants for defendants who fail to appear at court
and can hold witnesses, attorneys, and anyone else who violates their
commands in contempt.140
True, litigants can appeal judges’ decisions. But only to other
judges. Assessing the power of judges, then, requires widening the
lens to include all judges with authority in a given jurisdiction—a
lineup that includes magistrates, trial judges, appellate judges, on up
to the United States Supreme Court. Judges consciously act as a col-
lective. They magnify their individual powers by accepting an estab-
lished hierarchy that binds lower court judges to decisions of higher
courts. This hierarchy gives judges, collectively, substantial control
over the criminal justice system. Individually elected at the local level,
state prosecutors (the large bulk of this country’s prosecutors)141 lack
a similar hierarchy, decreasing prosecutorial power in the aggregate.
The power-magnification effects of coordination (and their absence)
are illustrated by the relative powerlessness of the one actor who is
notoriously crippled by an inability to coordinate: defense attorneys.
Even within the same office, defense attorneys’ obligation to indi-
vidual client interests undermines their ability to engage in coordi-
nated actions (e.g., refusing all plea deals), diluting their influence
over the criminal justice system below that of other actors.142
Commentators (including judges) sometimes suggest that judges
are neutral observers of the severity (or leniency) of the criminal jus-
139 See, e.g., United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2012); State v. Hancock,
727 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
140 See generally Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n,
389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (“The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon.”).
141 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Hon. John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1099 (1995) (“[T]he
number of federal prosecutors is small compared to their state and local counterparts,
comprising roughly ten percent of the national total.”). The most recent statistical survey
of state prosecutors counted approximately 25,000 in 2007. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN
BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 4 tbl.2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf. There were fewer than 6000 Assistant United States Attorneys in that
year. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 3
(2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2008/06/17/07statrpt.pdf.
142 See John H. Blume, How the “Shackles” of Individual Ethics Prevent Structural
Reform in the American Criminal Justice System, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 23, 38 (2016) (“If [defense] lawyers had the ability to act collectively and to
take actions, something approaching structural reform of the criminal justice system would
likely be achieved.”).
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tice system.143 This sentiment is highlighted when individual judges
deplore restrictions on their discretion.144 It is certainly true that
judges run into constraints. The problem is not a lack of judicial
power, however. The problem is usually that the judges at the top of
the hierarchy decide to exercise their power in ways that lower court
judges disagree with and the judges lower in the hierarchy feel obli-
gated to acquiesce.145 It is, perhaps, the greatest testament to the
power of the prosecutorial preeminence narrative that the judges who
craft and preside over the criminal justice system can be portrayed as
hapless bystanders to prosecutorial might.146
Judicial power is easy to miss because judges are conditioned to
act (and speak) as if they have none. Even in the most controversial
and free-wheeling cases, judges cloak the exercise of their power in
the guise of implementing the will of other actors, such as legislators
or the framers of the Constitution.147 John Roberts famously informed
senators at his confirmation hearing that, even as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, his job would be merely to “call balls and strikes.”148
143 Philip K. Howard, Judges: The Problem and Solution to America’s Judiciary Mess,
ATLANTIC (June 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/judges-the-
problem-and-solution-to-americas-judiciary-mess/258131; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Why
Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty (“[I]t is the prosecutor, not the judge,
who effectively exercises the sentencing power, albeit cloaked as a charging decision.”).
144 See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin, I Sentenced Criminals to Hundreds More Years Than I
Wanted To. I Had No Choice., WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/17/i-sentenced-criminals-to-hundreds-more-years-than-i-
wanted-to-i-had-no-choice (“I would never have imposed that sentence if I hadn’t been
forced to.”).
145 See generally Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh, Caryl Chessman, and the
Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion, 20
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2015) (“Historically, courts have accepted—and indeed been a
part of—the transfer of power from judges to prosecutors.”).
146 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 105 (“American criminal justice is a largely administrative R
system run by prosecutors.”); cf. Gottschalk, supra note 98, at 575 (“Several landmark R
court cases challenging prosecutors’ wide prerogatives were decided in their favor and
further enhanced their powers.”).
147 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 604 (1977) (Berger, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not give the Members of this Court
license to engraft their conceptions of proper public policy onto the considered legislative
judgments of the States.”); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106–07 (1908) (“[W]e must
take care that we do not import into the discussion our own personal views of what would
be wise, just and fitting rules . . . and confound them with constitutional limitations.”),
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
148 Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 641 (2012). The broad
parameters of constitutional criminal procedure illustrate the widely-recognized problem
with Roberts’s analogy. Roberts would have to envision, for example, strikes as pitches
that are “due” a batter (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) and balls as pitches that are
“unreasonable” (Fourth Amendment). But that’s not how umpiring works in baseball: The
strike zone is concretely delineated by reference to home plate and the batter’s shoulders
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The degree to which judges themselves believe in these constraints or
simply genuflect to them to maintain their legitimacy (and ease confir-
mation) is beyond the scope of this Article. But even if we accept that
judges must work within the rough boundaries set forth by legislative
actors, those boundaries, particularly in the criminal justice sphere,
are exceedingly malleable.149 The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel
and unusual” punishments, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unrea-
sonable” searches and seizures, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments dictate that all criminal defendants receive “due pro-
cess.” That’s why judges often disagree. In criminal cases, they possess
vast discretion to carve out new formations in the criminal justice
landscape.
As a result of the broad legal spaces within which judges work,
virtually every criminal injustice that crosses the news wire resonates
with an important ruling by a judicial body. The Supreme Court, for
example, has ruled that lengthy terms of imprisonment for minor
crimes do not constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment,150 coercive
plea bargaining is consistent with “due process”151 (both 5-4 deci-
sions), and that pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth
Amendment (9-0).152 State courts generate analogues of these deci-
sions interpreting State constitutional and legislative commands.153
The very existence of these cases implies that the courts could have
ruled another way. Some have.154 And when they do, those decisions
and knees. The Strike Zone: A Historical Timeline, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_
info/umpires/strike_zone.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
149 See Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1079 n.18 (2010)
(explaining that legislatures anticipate or intend ambiguity in statutory language).
150 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (upholding life sentence for a
defendant, with two prior felony convictions, convicted of stealing three golf clubs).
151 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59 (1978) (rejecting challenge to
conviction that resulted in life sentence after prosecutor threatened to add recidivism
enhancement if defendant did not accept plea offer involving five-year sentence).
152 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
153 See, e.g., State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Iowa 2014); The Chair King, Inc. v.
GTE Mobilnet of Hous., Inc., 184 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. 2006).
154 See, e.g., Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[W]e hold that due
process has been offended by placing petitioner in fear of retaliatory action for insisting
upon his constitutional right to stand trial.”), rev’d sub nom. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357;
see also Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing:
Preliminary Findings on “Doing Justice,” 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995) (reporting
on California judges’ avoidance of mandatory sentencing regimes); cf. State v. Kumukau,
787 P.2d 682, 684, 688 (Haw. 1990) (reversing an effective-life sentence for defendant
convicted of several counts of armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder of a
police officer).
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 16 Side B      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 16 Side B      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 28 26-APR-19 9:22
198 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:171
bind lower courts.155 In the case of the Supreme Court interpreting
constitutional principles, the rulings must be enforced by every state
and federal court across the country.156 A fifty-year-old Supreme
Court decision requires the country’s almost one million police
officers157 to read a set of warnings about the perils of cooperation to
suspects they wish to question.158 That is power. Judges effectively
abolished the death penalty159 and then blessed its return.160 The
Supreme Court required states to open their coffers to provide attor-
neys to indigent defendants.161 Judicial decisions set the boundaries
for other criminal justice actors, including prosecutors and the judges
themselves.162 Even when granting great freedom to these other
actors, these rulings reflect the exercise of power, not its absence.
C. Prosecutors Versus Legislators
Legislators are clearly more powerful than prosecutors. No one
would pay to watch this lopsided contest. Take any criminal justice
example and the legislature has greater power. Yes, prosecutors can
dismiss marijuana cases. But legislators can legalize marijuana.
Congress could make the marijuana leaf the national symbol,
emblazon it on the American flag, and introduce “Puff the Magic
Dragon” as the new national anthem. Legislators could create govern-
ment marijuana-distribution centers and issue free daily doses to
every man, woman, and child. (You get the idea.) Prosecutors cannot
do anything like that.
Even at the extreme bounds of their power—declining all cases of
a certain type in an effort to nullify a law—prosecutors are less pow-
erful than legislators. Prosecutors could issue a public promise, for
155 Legal Research: An Overview: Mandatory v. Persuasive Authority, UCLA SCH. L.,
http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/c.php?g=686105&p=5160745 (last updated July 19, 2018, 9:55
AM).
156 See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402 (N.J. 1965) (“We, of course, recognize
that the United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter on all questions of federal
constitutional law.”).
157 Law Enforcement Facts, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND, http://
www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (“There are more than
900,000 sworn law enforcement officers now serving in the United States . . . .”).
158 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
159 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
160 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007) (describing history).
161 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (holding the right to have
assistance of counsel is a fundamental right under the Sixth Amendment).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 753 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
Supreme Court case law required affirmance of life sentence that the district court
criticized and adding that “[a]lthough the district court concluded that Angelos’s sentence
was disproportionate to his crimes, we disagree”).
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example, not to prosecute marijuana possession or petty theft in their
jurisdiction. But police officers could continue to arrest people for
those crimes, regardless of whether prosecution ultimately resulted.163
And if defendants sit in jail while awaiting a court-ordered dismissal,
many defendants’ punishment would approximate the lawful sanctions
for minor crimes. Further, legislators could punish prosecutors for
recalcitrance in creative ways. They could cut prosecutor office
budgets.164 Or, legislators might institute alternative mechanisms to
punish offenders and place those mechanisms outside of prosecutors’
hands. They might grant police more flexibility in determining where
to file their cases, allowing officers to shop around for like-minded
prosecutors. Or, legislatures could permit police to litigate cases them-
selves, already a common occurrence in a number of jurisdictions.165
Prosecutors do not often push the boundaries set by the legisla-
ture, but when they do, there is a predictable backlash. For example,
when a prosecutor in Orlando announced she would no longer seek
the death penalty, Florida’s governor invoked a statute allowing him
to reassign cases for “good and sufficient reason,” and sent Orlando’s
death-eligible cases to a hand-picked prosecutor in another jurisdic-
tion.166 The Florida courts upheld the action, citing a similar ruling in
New York.167
Confronted on this difficult terrain, many commentators would
likely acknowledge legislative primacy. The truth behind the rhetoric,
they would explain, is that legislators have used their primacy to
create a system in which prosecutors are the most powerful actor. In
the world that legislators created, prosecutors “run[ ] the show.”168
Here is a vivid description along these lines:
163 Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender.”).
164 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 786 (2006) (explaining that legislators “write budgets for the agencies that
enforce those laws: police forces, prosecutors’ offices, public defenders’ offices, courts, and
prisons”).
165 See Natapoff, supra note 59 (“In hundreds of misdemeanor courts in at least 14 R
states, police officers can file criminal charges and handle court cases, acting as prosecutor
as well as witness and negotiator.”).
166 Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 2017).
167 Id.; see also Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997) (upholding
Governor’s reassignment of a single case in similar circumstances).
168 Gershman, supra note 30, at 405 n.74 (1992); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY R
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007) (asserting that prosecutors
are the “most powerful officials in the criminal justice system”); MARIE GOTTSCHALK,
CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 268 (2015)
(claiming that prosecutors are the “preeminent players in this game”).
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“Criminal law scholars are in near complete agreement that
prosecutorial discretion now dominates the path that a particular
case follows in the criminal system . . . .”169
This species of prosecutorial-power quote epitomizes the genre. It
removes the legislature from the equation by framing the criminal jus-
tice system as a discrete, unchangeable set of pathways. It overlooks
the role of police by spontaneously placing the defendant on the track
awaiting the decision of the powerful prosecutor. And it discounts the
influence of judges, parole and probation officers, and governors. If
we assume the pathways are set in stone, and that no one else is inter-
ested or able to intervene, the prosecutor finally does look like the
most powerful actor. One can’t help but think of the joke about the
economist stranded on a desert island with a can of food but no way to
open it; the economist’s solution is to assume the existence of a can
opener. That’s how prosecutorial-power rhetoric works too. If we
assume everyone else is powerless or paralyzed, prosecutors have
great power. Weber would not approve.
Prosecutors are not achieving goals over the resistance of other
criminal justice actors. They are facilitating the goals approved by
those other actors. Legislators, judges, police, governors, voters, etc.,
are not “shocked, shocked”170 at the outputs of the American criminal
justice system. They make and remake the system every day. Prosecu-
tors, for the most part, dutifully implement their commands.
Take, for example, one of the most compelling examples cited to
support prosecutorial-dominance rhetoric, the case of Weldon
Angelos. In 2002, Angelos conducted three separate sales of mari-
juana to a government informant, carrying a gun to two of the
exchanges.171 A jury convicted Angelos of those offenses.172 District
court Judge Paul Cassell sentenced him to fifty-five years in prison,
while issuing a fiery opinion denouncing the statutorily-mandated sen-
tence as “cruel, unjust, and even irrational.”173 Cassell wrote:
[T]he court . . . calls on the President—in whom our Constitution
reposes the power to correct unduly harsh sentences—to commute
Mr. Angelos’s sentence to something that is more in accord with
just and rational punishment. In particular, the court recommends
that the President commute Mr. Angelos’s sentence to no more
169 Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 882
(2014).
170 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros./First National Pictures 1942).
171 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230–32 (D. Utah 2004).
172 Id. at 1232.
173 Id. at 1230.
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 18 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 18 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 31 26-APR-19 9:22
May 2019] THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS 201
than 18 years in prison, the average sentence that the jurors in this
case recommended.174
The Angelos case reflects three hallmarks of prosecutorial power:
(1) It was a federal prosecution; (2) the offense was covered by mul-
tiple, severe mandatory sentences; and (3) the evidence against
Angelos was “overwhelming.”175 And indeed the prosecutor could
have changed the outcome in two ways. First, the prosecutor could
have offered a more generous plea deal.176 In fact, the prosecutor
offered to recommend a sentence of fifteen years in prison if Angelos
pleaded guilty (just under Cassell’s post-trial recommendation).177
Angelos declined the offer.178 Second, the prosecutor could have
declined to charge some or all of the offenses.
The prosecutor obviously influenced the outcome in the Angelos
case. But so did every other criminal justice actor implicated,
including Angelos. Angelos never receives a fifty-five year sentence
unless: (1) The legislature passes a statute that dictates severe
mandatory minimum sentences for distributing drugs while armed,
and requires that such sentences run consecutively for each occur-
rence;179 (2) the courts decline to deem the statute unconstitutional or
limit its reach;180 (3) the police wait until Angelos conducts three sep-
arate sales before arresting him;181 (4) the police deliver the case to
prosecutors, and specifically to federal—not state—prosecutors;
(5) the defendant refuses a plea deal that appears to closely track the
judge’s preferred sentence (“the shadow of trial”); (6) the jury con-
victs on the counts that require mandatory sentences; (7) the trial
judge, following Supreme Court precedent, refuses to declare this par-
ticular sentence unconstitutional (“cruel and unusual”) instead
174 Id. at 1230–31.
175 United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 749 (10th Cir. 2006).
176 See Bellin, supra note 2, at 844–45, 848 (noting that “prosecutor’s power is at its apex R
in deciding not to bring charges” and highlighting the “prosecutor’s broad discretion to
offer concessions in exchange for guilty pleas”).
177 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
178 Id. at 1232.
179 See id. at 1230 (“While the sentence appears to be cruel, unjust, and irrational, in our
system of separated powers Congress makes the final decisions as to appropriate criminal
penalties.”).
180 In fact, the Supreme Court did try to limit the language in 1995, see Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995), only to have Congress respond by amending the statute so
that it clearly applied in cases like Angelos’s. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d
409, 413 (5th Cir. 2000).
181 See John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1955, 1971–73 (2015) (“As the Angelos case demonstrates, if the individual drug
transaction is the unit of prosecution, prosecutors and police will have the power to
procure virtually any prison sentence they wish simply by manipulating the number of
controlled buys.”).
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labeling it “cruel, unjust, and irrational”—a decision upheld by the
appellate court, which went on to express disagreement with the trial
court’s characterization of the sentence as disproportionate;182 (8) the
President declines to issue a pardon or commutation; (9) Congress
abolishes parole.183 Assuming all of these things remain constant, the
prosecutor wields tremendous power and is the criminal justice
system. But it is misleading to hold every other variable constant and
then point to the prosecutor as holding all the power. We could simi-
larly hold the prosecutor’s behavior constant and say the jury holds all
the power, or the judge does, or the President, and on and on—any
one of whom could change the outcome, regardless of the prosecutor’s
objections.
These logical holes widen once we circle back to the elements
that make this case unusual.184 In a typical case, the prosecutor’s
charging options are less impactful, the government’s case is less air-
tight, the sentencing rules are more discretionary and less draconian,
and looming over everything is the parole system.185 Typical state
prosecutors are overburdened with cases,186 are unable to dictate
defendants’ sentences, and are worried about embarrassing trial
losses.187 This gives defendants leverage to extract more favorable
plea deals. The Angelos case is an outlier when it comes to
prosecutorial power, and even this case illustrates the prosecutors’
dependence on other criminal justice actors. The prosecutor in the
182 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 753 (10th
Cir. 2006).
183 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 109–10 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting
that through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, “Congress abolished parole for federal
offenders,” and also that “several States have followed suit”).
184 See Luna & Wade, supra note 16, at 1416 (“To some extent, [the Angelos] case is R
exceptional.”).
185 See W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate
Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 900 (2009) (“While
it is difficult to characterize the variety of sentencing systems in the fifty states and the
District of Columbia, the majority of states still impose sentences terminating in
discretionary parole release, and the ‘vast majority . . . have retained some form of
discretionary parole release and postrelease supervision.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 1996
NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE SENTENCING STRUCTURES, at xi (1998), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169270.pdf)).
186 See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 66, at 270 (reporting on astronomical state
prosecutor caseloads across the country, including Houston, Texas “where some
prosecutors are handling upwards of 1500 felonies per year and over 500 felonies at any
one time”).
187 See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is
How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for
Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 292–93 (2001) (explaining that fear of losing can be
so extreme as to lead to misconduct).
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Angelos case did not put the defendant in prison over resistance. He
did it with the support and assistance of every other criminal justice
institution implicated, including the police, the judiciary, and the
legislature.
As the next Part explores, the underlying assumption that every
other actor remains in an artificial stasis is the key to understanding
the only claims about prosecutorial power that matter—and their tox-
icity to candid criminal justice conversations.
IV
THE REFLECTIVE NATURE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER
As the previous Parts show, a rigorous assessment of
prosecutorial power belies the prosecutorial-preeminence echo
chamber that has grown up in the scholarly literature. Commentators
use the term “power” as if it says something simple, but these claims
paper over vast complexity. Distilled to their core, claims about
prosecutorial power are actually claims about the inaction of other
powerful actors—legislators, police, and judges. And, in fact, prosecu-
tors  typically appear powerful in these accounts only after other pow-
erful criminal justice actors empower and work in tandem with them
to implement severe outcomes. This is not “power” in any conven-
tional sense. Rather, it can more accurately be described as a reflec-
tion of the power of others. And this distinction is critical to
understanding how the criminal justice system works, diagnosing its
problems, and proposing reforms.
A. Prosecutors’ Reflective Power
There is great power in the criminal justice system. But because
the system consists of a complex interplay of independent actors, the
sources of this power can be difficult to detect. Academic claims of
prosecutorial power obscure these sources by holding everything con-
stant and then asserting that prosecutors dictate outcomes. If criminal
statutes are broad and severe, police bring prosecutors all the cases
they solve, judges go along with prosecutors’ recommendations (or
seek to impose even harsher sentences), parole boards keep people
locked away, governors issue pardons sparingly, etc., then prosecutors
possess great power. But this is not “power.” It is an illusion created
by rhetorically stripping all the other actors of their power, and then
pointing to a reflection of that power in prosecutors.188 Power is the
188 Cf. Levinson, supra note 20, at 141 (“Power is often located elsewhere than the site R
of action and camouflaged by inaction.”).
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ability to accomplish goals over resistance.189 Everyone becomes pow-
erful when all the other players stand still. Indeed, if we switch our
perspective to holding the prosecutor’s role constant, the same
sweeping claims of preeminence could be applied to police or judges
or legislators.
Take the war on drugs as an example. It could be halted to
varying degrees by any of the major criminal justice actors. Legislators
could decriminalize narcotics. Police could stop making arrests for
possession of drugs.190 Prosecutors could stop charging drug cases.191
Judges could dismiss them,192 regularly suppress drug evidence, sen-
tence drug crimes lightly, or deem drug crimes unconstitutional.193
What makes prosecutors special in this equation? Perhaps commenta-
tors seize on prosecutorial power because that power seems relatively
easy to activate. Legislators hew to political winds and need to find
consensus to act. Judges bow to hierarchy, and claim to be severely
restricted by formal sources of authority such as statutes and constitu-
tions. Police, purportedly, act with little discretion, mechanically deliv-
ering suspected law breakers to prosecutors for decisions about how
to proceed. By contrast, prosecutors’ decisions to drop cases, or even
stop charging certain categories of cases, can (commentators perceive)
be made unilaterally and without immediate check.194 But notice that
even if we credit the multitude of assumptions baked into the pre-
ceding statements, being more likely to act is a curious form of power.
And it is not even clear that prosecutors have more flexibility
than other actors. Let’s start with charging. Prosecutors can only
189 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (defining and explaining “power”). R
190 See, e.g., Jonathan Wolfe, Marijuana in New York: Here’s How the Laws Are
Changing, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/nyregion/
marijuana-laws-new-york.html (“[T]he New York Police Department will begin issuing
tickets for people who smoke weed in public instead of arresting them.”).
191 See, e.g., Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by
Philadelphia District Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.
com/news/local/Marijuana-Criminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-by-Philadelphia-District-
Attorney-Larry-Krasner-474228023.html (reporting on Philadelphia District Attorney’s
new policy to dismiss marijuana possession cases).
192 See, e.g., People v. Edwin C., 369 N.Y.S.2d 311, 316–17 (App. Div. 1975) (dismissing
the defendant’s drug charges sua sponte in the interest of justice).
193 Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660, 667 (1962) (striking down a state
law that made it a criminal offense to be “addicted to the use of narcotics”), with Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (rejecting challenge to federal authority to prohibit illegal
drugs), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part) (“Go to any federal prison in the country to see how a broad
conception of the commerce power has affected individual liberty through the passage of
federal gun-possession and drug-possession laws and sentencing mandates.”).
194 This flexibility may be primarily a function of the lack of attention to prosecutors’
actions.
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 20 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 20 Side A      04/26/2019   09:52:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 35 26-APR-19 9:22
May 2019] THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS 205
charge crimes they are aware of, and police are the primary mecha-
nism by which prosecutors become aware of crimes. This means that
prosecutors’ charging decisions, especially at the state level, are
largely dependent on police. Prosecutors are also limited, particularly
at the federal level, by legislative crime definitions. If the facts estab-
lished through police investigation do not fit a statutory crime, prose-
cutors lose the ability to charge an offense. Further, judges can take
certain charges off the table through procedural rulings, and by nar-
rowly interpreting statutes and rigorously assessing their constitution-
ality.195 This latter power is particularly impactful, as judges can wait
until well after trial to invoke it, undoing years of prosecutorial
effort.196 If prosecutors charge beyond the safety net provided by the
legislature and judges, they increase the chances of trial and an
embarrassing loss. If they charge substantially under what the facts
and law suggest, they risk political backlash.
Even assuming that all of the obstacles prosecutors must navigate
are more or less mechanical and predictable, the case for prosecutorial
flexibility still needs fleshing out. With respect to cases that judges,
legislators, and the public care a great deal about, prosecutors don’t
seem to have much freedom. For many serious crimes, prosecutors
have little choice but to file charges that parallel the facts of the
offense. Richman and Stuntz describe these offenses as “politically
mandatory.”197 Prosecutors can dismiss minor cases with little conse-
quence, but that is only because judges and legislators (and voters) do
not care as much about punishing those offenses and because of this,
the punishments avoided are less substantial.
Prosecutors also have great flexibility to recommend lower (or
higher) bail amounts and less (or more) severe sentences.198 But the
final decision falls to the judge (or for mandatory sentences, the legis-
lature) who may or may not follow the prosecutor’s suggestion. When
sentences involve probation or parole, as they often do,199 prosecutors
fall further out of the picture, as judges and parole boards monitor
195 See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361, 2375 (2016) (vacating the
federal bribery convictions of a former Virginia Governor that prosecutors had obtained
two years previously by narrowly interpreting the term “official act”).
196 See, e.g., id.
197 Richman & Stuntz, supra note 66, at 600. R
198 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (c)(1)(a) (explaining that prosecutor can “recommend,
or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, that a particular sentence or sentencing
range is appropriate” but emphasizing that “such a recommendation or request does not
bind the court”); Bellin, supra note 2, at 849 & n.78 (highlighting requirement for judicial R
approval of plea deals in all fifty states). For a discussion of bail rules, see BARADARAN
BAUGHMAN, supra note 52, at 40–41. R
199 See Bellin, supra note 2, at 844 (estimating that forty-five percent of prison inmates R
are incarcerated for parole and probation violations).
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and adjust initial sentences based on subsequent developments.200
Again, what looks like prosecutorial power is merely a reflection of a
power lodged in other actors.
Cutting through the hyperbole, then, claims of prosecutorial
power turn out to be little more than vaguely articulated, undeveloped
contentions about prosecutorial freedom to manipulate the power
held by others. Commentators allege that prosecutors have space to
operate where judges, police, and even legislators seem constrained.
The evidence for this proposition is unclear, since it is more likely that
these other actors have no desire to act differently than that they are
prevented from implementing their desires. And since this point is
rarely made explicit, there is a great deal of work to be done in sup-
porting it. It may simply be that prosecutors’ lack of transparency and
unwillingness to go against the political grain create an inflated per-
ception of maneuverability. But even if it were proven that prosecu-
tors are more flexible than other actors, that doesn’t mean they are
more powerful. It just means that they have an untapped ability to
reflect and (perhaps) redirect other actors’ power. And that difference
has profound implications for modern criminal justice debates and
prescriptions for reform.
B. What About Lobbying?
When all else fails, the last line of prosecutorial-power rhetoric
turns to lobbying. In this iteration, prosecutors are powerful because
they advocate for the laws that grant them power and block changes
to those laws.
“No other group comes close to prosecutorial lobbying efforts on
crime issues.”201
“[P]rosecutors are especially effective lobbyists for criminal law
expansion . . . .”202
“[T]he powerful state prosecutor lobby . . . has scuttled criminal jus-
tice reform efforts across the country . . . .”203
200 See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
PRISONER REENTRY 47 (Jeffrey Butts et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that “typically,” parole
revocation “hearings are held before an administrative law judge employed by the parole
board or the parole board itself”).
201 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005); cf. Aziz
Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1445–46
(2016) (“[A]lthough formally the first mover in the definition of federal criminal law, in
practice, Congress is better viewed as responsive to executive branch needs. Congress is
heavily and asymmetrically lobbied by the Department of Justice.”).
202 Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 232
(2007).
203 Radley Balko, Behind the Scenes, Prosecutor Lobbies Wield Immense Power, WASH.
POST: THE WATCH (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/
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The most obvious response to this argument is that it directly sit-
uates prosecutorial power as an ability to influence legislators. That
makes legislators more powerful. (No one has more influence over
legislators than legislators.) And even if we examine the claim on its
own terms, there is still much work to be done to show that prosecu-
tors are powerful lobbyists and, if so, why.
The mechanism by which prosecutorial lobbying influences crim-
inal law is unclear. Prosecutors’ associations do not possess the tradi-
tional means to influence legislators. They possess neither large voting
memberships nor vast sums of money. There are about 25,000 prose-
cutors scattered across the country,204 and their interests vary. Prose-
cutors cannot deliver a large number of voters like the AARP (thirty-
eight million members),205 the NRA (four million members),206 or
MoveOn.org (seven million members).207 Also, unlike those groups,
prosecutors’ organizations lack storehouses of cash that they can use
to take down disfavored legislators. In fact, the modern political land-
scape more readily produces illustrations of the opposite—well-
funded groups funneling cash and resources to vote disfavored prose-
cutors out of office.208 Even within the criminal justice system, police
look like a much stronger lobby than prosecutors.209 And when law
enforcement takes on traditional lobbying groups, such as the gun
lobby, they often lose. The spread of so-called “stand your ground”
2018/04/23/behind-the-scenes-prosecutor-lobbies-wield-immense-power/; see also Josie
Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just Enforcing the Law—They’re Making It, APPEAL (Apr.
20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-they-re-making-it-
d83e6e59f97a/ (arguing that while prosecutors do not get a vote in state legislatures, “in
many—if not all—state legislatures, they have leverage over those that do”).
204 See supra note 141. R
205 Laura Johannes, AARP Faces Competition from Conservative-Leaning Groups,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2014, 5:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aarp-faces-competition-
from-conservative-leaning-groups-1394667995.
206 Glenn Kessler, Does the NRA Really Have More than 4.5 Million Members?, WASH.
POST (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/does-the-nra-
really-have-more-than-45-million-members/2013/02/07/06047c10-7164-11e2-ac36-
3d8d9dcaa2e2_blog.html.
207 Amanda Terkel & Ryan Grim, MoveOn Moving On: Progressive Powerhouse
Launches Radical Strategic Overhaul, HUFF. POST (Dec. 4, 2012, 8:49 PM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/moveon-changes_n_2240238.html.
208 See, e.g., Bland, supra note 15 (“Progressives have zeroed in on electing prosecutors R
as an avenue for criminal justice reform, and the billionaire financier is providing the cash
to make it happen.”).
209 See, e.g., About the Fraternal Order of Police, FRATERNAL ORD. POLICE, https://
www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=223 (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (boasting more than 330,000
members); Steve Young Law Enforcement Legislative Advocacy Center, FRATERNAL ORD.
POLICE, https://www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=34 (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (“The FOP
maintains an office in Washington, D.C. on Capitol Hill, where a full-time professional
staff actively lobbies Congress and the Administration on the issues most important to
rank-and-file law enforcement officers.”).
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laws across the country, for example, hints at the fragile nature of
prosecutor lobbying power when that power is tested by a true polit-
ical juggernaut, like the NRA.210
The best evidence of prosecutors’ lobbying power comes in the
form of the correspondence between legislation that passes (or is
defeated) and position statements of individual prosecutors, or
groups.211 There has been no systematic study of this effect, but even
if the correlation is sound, it can easily be framed as something other
than lobbying power. What commentators think of as effective prose-
cutor lobbying may, in fact, be a shared interest among prosecutors
and lawmakers.212 Again, Stuntz provides guidance: “Advancing
police and prosecutors’ goals usually means advancing legislators’
goals as well. Thus, legislators have good reason to listen when prose-
cutors urge some statutory change.”213 Notice, though, that contrary
to the characterization of modern commentary, this does not make
prosecutors “a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues”214 in any
normal sense. Instead, it suggests that prosecutors have little need to
lobby. Given a choice, legislators (and their voters) often favor the
(“tough-on-crime”) positions that prosecutors traditionally take. A
similar story could be spun about public parks. Legislators don’t sup-
port parks because the parks department and park ranger associations
are a powerful lobbying force. Legislators support parks because
voters do too. These are bland stories of legislative power in a democ-
racy, not conspiratorial tales of prosecutorial (or park ranger) power.
C. How Should We Talk About Prosecutorial Power?
Generic prosecutorial-power claims may have once been valuable
to highlight the overlooked influence of prosecutors. Prosecutors no
longer escape notice. Criminal justice commentators are focused on
prosecutors, and have been for some time. The next step is zeroing in
on precisely what prosecutors do and, to the extent those practices are
objectionable, exploring how they can be changed. Vague claims of
immense prosecutorial power and false assertions of preeminence
only detract from this discussion.
210 See Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
7, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/us/07shoot.html (“Many prosecutors oppose
the laws, saying they are unnecessary at best and pernicious at worst.”).
211 See supra note 203.
212 Cf. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587–88 (2002) (“The only area in which
we heard that paid lobbyists had a limited role was standard criminal law issues, where
there is no real lobby but where the Department of Justice is a regular player.”).
213 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 9, at 534. R
214 Id.
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Speaking precisely enables policymakers and reformers to eval-
uate the prosecutorial function, its impacts, and the need for reform in
particular jurisdictions.215 Often this precision will expose the reflec-
tive nature of prosecutorial power—revealing that the perceived
problem lies elsewhere, usually in judicial or legislative actions, but
also sometimes in unexpected corners like parole boards and proba-
tion officers. For example, rather than claiming that prosecutors wield
enormous power, a precise claim about charging powers could be ren-
dered as:
In jurisdiction X, a prosecutor has the discretion to charge a repeat
felony offender with a recidivism enhancement that mandates an
additional fifteen-year sentence.216
Assessing the significance of this power, advocates, scholars, and
policymakers would reflect on how likely the occurrence is and
whether it represents a normatively desirable state of affairs. Those
inclined toward reform may recognize that the best solutions target
the enhancement itself, and particularly its severity—not prosecutorial
discretion. The prosecutorial power highlighted in the blurb above is a
tool of leniency.217 Removing the prosecutor’s discretion while
retaining the enhancement would increase, not decrease, sentencing
severity. Of course, the discretion to charge or forego the enhance-
ment gives prosecutors plea bargaining leverage. But taking away that
discretion (while retaining the enhancement) would incentivize the
parties to seek other avenues for manipulating the enhancement’s
application (or cause its imposition to become automatic). Finally,
even if reformers convince some prosecutors to unilaterally forgo the
enhancement, legislators—convinced of its worth—could respond by
bypassing prosecutors and directing judges to inquire into and assess
the recidivist penalty.218 Or, as Washington State does, dictate that
prosecutors must allege prior convictions when applicable.219
215 For an example of speaking precisely about prosecutorial power, see Melanie D.
Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—Reminders to Encourage a Culture
of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 92 (2008) (“[T]he [federal] prosecutor’s power
to award or deny a substantial-assistance sentence reduction is virtually unlimited.”).
216 Cf. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 354 (2009) (“Sentencing enhancements and
mandatory minimum sentences give prosecutors undeniable power.”).
217 See DAVIS, supra note 46, at 170 (“[T]he power to be lenient is the power to R
discriminate.”).
218 See, e.g., Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
“recidivist enhancements” are “not require[d] to be charged before trial and tried to a
jury”).
219 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.421(6) (West 2010) (explaining that “in no
instance may the prosecutor agree not to allege prior convictions” as part of a plea
agreement).
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Here is another example with sufficient specificity to allow a
critique:
“[P]rosecutors’ ability to threaten inflated sentences, combined with
their power to trade those sentences away for pleas of guilt, allows
them to control ‘who goes to prison and for how long.’”220
Plea bargaining is a common focus of prosecutor power claims,221 but
it is misleading to characterize plea bargaining as a source of
prosecutorial power. Instead, plea bargaining is a reflection of the
power of other actors. That is why it has proven almost impossible to
control.222 At its core, plea bargaining is a cooperative effort between
the system’s assumed adversaries (prosecutors and defendants) to
avoid legislatively and judicially directed outcomes.223 Cooperation is
required because, while prosecutors can offer deals, defendants can
veto them. The defendant’s ability to demand a trial becomes more
difficult, of course, the greater the spread between the prosecutor’s
offer and the likely outcome after trial (“the trial penalty”). A broad
spread can be a result of a particularly generous plea offer, or an
(expected) draconian post-trial sentence. But that doesn’t mean that
prosecutors control the outcome. Defendants’ absolute veto means
that they will only agree to a prosecutor’s offer if the legislature’s
“offer” (a mandatory sentence) or the judge’s “offer” (an expected
discretionary sentence) is worse.224 This means that prosecutors’ plea-
bargaining power is derivative of judicial and legislative power. Judges
and legislatures indirectly dictate the terms of prosecutors’ plea offers
by setting the backdrop against which defendants assess those offers.
In a jurisdiction where juries acquit regularly and judges sentence
modestly, defendants will reject severe plea offers.225 In another juris-
diction where juries readily convict and judges sentence severely,
220 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1303, 1304 (2018) (quoting Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 9). R
221 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 2, at 487 (“[T]he core of prosecutorial power in the R
United States today, as it is generally described, is the ability to coerce guilty pleas.”).
222 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (tracing the evolution of plea bargaining and exploring
how it has come to dominate the American criminal justice system over the last 150 years).
223 Cf. Gifford, supra note 176, at 41, 79 n.232 (explaining that plea bargaining has the R
capacity to frustrate both judicial and legislative intent); Stemen & Escobar, supra note 56, R
at 6 (summarizing research that suggests prosecutors “have a ‘downstream orientation’ that
leads them to anticipate and consider how other actors not yet involved in the process,
such as judges and juries, will respond to a case”).
224 See Bellin, supra note 2, at 849–52 (describing this dynamic). R
225 See Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge
Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1580 (2012) (explaining that in making
plea decisions, defendants will take into account the sentences they expect to receive upon
conviction and the likelihood of conviction).
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defendants will accept them.226 The prosecutors in the latter jurisdic-
tion are not more powerful than their counterparts in the former; they
are simply reflecting the power of other actors.
Greater precision will also reveal areas where prosecutor power
claims are technically accurate, but not particularly worrisome, as in:
The prosecutor has the power to decline to pursue even readily-
provable, serious crimes.
While legally accurate, this is a practically difficult power for a prose-
cutor to exercise without substantial backlash from victims, the media,
and, ultimately, voters.227 Thus, it is unlikely that prosecutors will sys-
tematically drop serious, readily-provable cases.228
Another claim might be:
Prosecutors recommend bail amounts to judges who go along with
those requests seventy-five percent of the time.229
Here, precision highlights that if bail is a problem in the particular
jurisdiction, the judges imposing bail are the logical target, alongside
the legislative framework that authorizes judges to do so. Any lasting
solution to flawed bail systems will go through legislatures and judges,
not prosecutors.
As these examples illustrate, precise phrasing of prosecutorial
powers will often reveal the complexity of the underlying issues. Often
what looks like a problematic choice by a prosecutor is a reflection of
decisions made by other, more powerful criminal justice actors: a dra-
conian recidivism enhancement, a judicial bail determination, or a
judicially-imposed or legislatively-mandated trial penalty. Reforms
that myopically focus on prosecutors who “rule the system”230 over-
look that dynamic, jeopardizing their long-term efficacy.
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a)(2) (West 2015) (prohibiting “[p]lea
bargaining in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony,”
with limited exceptions, including “insufficient evidence to prove the people’s case”).
228 See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to
American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 317, 338–39 (1995) (“Although legally free to do so, American prosecutors decline
prosecution of relatively few serious felonies for which the evidence is sufficient to
convict.”). But see Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-
higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (highlighting criticism of the Department of
Justice for failing to prosecute serious cases that arise on American Indian reservations).
229 Cf. Casey Tolan, Making Freedom Free, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:15 AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_and_error/2017/03/poor_defendants_get_
locked_up_because_they_can_t_afford_cash_bail_here_s.html (“Bail is set by judges, but
prosecutors have huge influence on the process.”).
230 See supra note 12 (providing examples of scholarly pronouncements that prosecutors R
“rule the system”).
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CONCLUSION
Prosecutors are not powerless. Indeed, virtually every criminal
justice outcome can be traced to a prosecutor’s decision. But this exer-
cise—“six degrees of prosecution”—can be conducted with many
other criminal justice actors. For every prosecutor who asks for a high
bail or severe sentence, there is a legislature that authorized the result
and a judge who imposed it. Every story about a reform bill that died
in the legislature after opposition from prosecutors is a story about a
prior legislature’s severity and a present legislature’s failure to enact
reform. Every critique of a prosecutor’s refusal to charge a police
officer for an illegal shooting rests against a backdrop of a police
officer who pulled the trigger, and a longstanding pattern of judges
and juries reluctant to convict in police violence cases.231 Even the
most sophisticated critique—that prosecutors control outcomes
through plea bargaining—ignores that defendants must agree to any
plea deal and that their agreement depends on the background deci-
sions of judges, juries, and legislators.
Prosecutors are one of the many important actors who populate
the criminal justice ecosystem. Police, legislators, judges, governors,
and parole boards are important too. The cacophonic rhetoric of
prosecutorial dominance, however, ignores the agency of these other
actors, fostering a rhetorically pleasing, but hopelessly flawed under-
standing of the criminal justice system. This blinkered approach over-
looks the powerful forces that can and do constrain prosecutors and
diverts attention from the most promising sources of lasting reform,
like legislators, judges, and police, to the least.
231 See Daniel Arkin & Ron Allen, It’s Very Difficult to Convict Officers in Police
Shootings, Experts Say, NBC NEWS (June 27, 2017, 5:15 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/it-s-very-difficult-convict-officers-police-shootings-experts-say-n776901
(“[P]ersuading jurors that the police have committed a crime, and not just made a mistake,
goes against [the dominant] narrative. It’s a very steep hill for prosecutors to climb.”);
Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (last
updated Oct. 3, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-
shooting-cases/index.html (chronicling recent acquittals in judge and jury trials of police
officers).
